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OPTIMAL CONNECTIVITY FOR A LARGE FINANCIAL NETWORK ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
Rui Chen1, Andreea Minca2 and Agnès Sulem3
Abstract. We investigate network formation for a set of financial institutions represented as nodes.
Linkages are source of income, and at the same time they bear the risk of contagion. The optimal
connectivity of the nodes results from a game, in which the risk of contagion depends on the choices of
all nodes in the system. Our financial network model can be interpreted as a set of banks connected
through funding relations, in which a node’s threshold to contagion is represented by its external
funding capacity. A second interpretation is that of a set of insurers connected through reinsurance
contracts, in which the threshold to contagion is represented by their capital. Our results show that
when the threshold distribution across the nodes has higher variance, then, in equilibrium, the average
connectivity is in general increasing, but the link failure probability decreases. This suggests that
financial stability is best described in terms of the mechanism of network formation than in terms of
simple statistics of the network topology like the average connectivity.
Résumé. On étudie la formation d’un réseau financier dont les noeuds représentent des institutions
financières. Les liens sont sources de revenus mais également de risque de contagion de défaut. La
connectivité optimale du réseau résulte d’un jeu, dans lequel le risque de contagion dépend de tous les
noeuds du système. Notre réseau peut être interprété comme un ensemble de banques connectées entre
elles par des relations de financement, le seuil de contagion de défaut pour une banque représentant
ici sa capacité de financement extérieur. On peut aussi appliquer notre modèle à l’étude d’un réseau
d’assureurs connectés par des contrats de réassurance, pour lesquels le seuil de contagion de chaque
noeud est son capital. Nos résultats montrent que lorsque la distribution du seuil de contagion de
défaut sur l’ensemble des noeuds a une grande variance, la connectivité moyenne croit, alors que la
probabilité de défaut décroit. Cela suggère que l’étude de la stabilité financière d’un réseau financier
doit prendre en compte le mécanisme de formation du réseau et pas seulement sa connectivité moyenne.
Introduction
Interconnected systems are subject to contagion in time of distress. Recent effort has been dedicated to
understanding the relation between network topology and the scope of distress propagation, see e.g., [1, 2, 5, 16]
and the references therein. It is critical to recognize that connectivity is a result of an optimization problem of
agents, who derive benefits from connections and view the associated contagion risk as a cost. In the context
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of financial systems, this benefit-cost view of connections is first presented in [5], who analyze socially optimal
network topologies.
A threshold model of contagion for heterogenous graphs is proposed in [1]. Each node represents a bank,
insurance company or institution, and is endowed with a threshold to contagion. A set of nodes fail exogenously
and any node in the system can fail due to contagion when its threshold is surpassed by the number of connected
nodes that fail. The availability of asymptotic results on the fraction of nodes that fail at the end of the contagion
process allows us to estimate the failure probability for a network with given connectivity. In this paper, we
take a step further and find the equilibrium choice of connectivity. The banks’ payoff is impacted by their
own choice of connectivity, which governs both the benefits from linkages as well as the exposure to the risk of
contagion in the network. The risk of contagion in turn depends on all the banks’ connectivity choices.
The fundamentals in the model are represented by the thresholds. Under full information, the distribution
of the thresholds across banks is common knowledge. Once a node chooses its connectivity, the network is
generated using the configuration model. This is a random graph chosen uniformly over all graphs with the given
connectivity sequence across nodes. For this random graph, a law of large numbers gives the limit probability
that a randomly chosen link fails, i.e. it links to a failed node. This probability depends on the join distribution
of the connectivity and thresholds. Our equilibrium concept is a rational expectations equilibrium. For an
anticipated link failure probability, nodes choose their optimal connectivity as a function of their threshold. We
then ensure that the anticipated link failure probability is equal to the failure probability in the network with
the chosen connectivity.
Our equilibrium model is quite different from past literature. In [5] the authors use the notion of pairwise Nash
stability and a contagion mechanism in which nodes fail with an exogenous probability when a neighbor fails.
The notion of pairwise Nash stability is also used in [8]. Here we exploit the asymptotic results for contagion
scope in our particular choice of random graph, where connectivity is optimized but the actual neighbors are
randomly chosen. We are interested in the optimal connectivity as a function of fundamentals, namely the
thresholds. Our notion of equilibrium can be seen as a Nash equilibrium with a continuum of players, classified
according to their thresholds and we obtain a unique such equilibrium.
For the asymptotic case, our results allow us to understand how the degree of heterogeneity in the fundamen-
tals translates into failure risk in the network with endogenous connectivity. Nodes adjust their connectivity
to the degree of heterogeneity in the fundamentals. When the fundamentals are more homogenous, then the
average connectivity is lower, but the failure probability is higher than in the case when there is more dis-
persion in the fundamentals. The network payoff is defined as the average number of links times the survival
probability. For different fundamentals, the network connectivity is adjusted in equilibrium to yield the same
network payoffs. However, these networks are not equivalent from the point of view of systemic risk. To obtain
lower default probability and systemic risk, more dispersion in fundamentals is preferable. In this case, nodes
with large thresholds would act as stabilizers in time of distress. Our results are in line with [8], who obtain
in a different model that economies that are fundamentally “safer”, in the sense that they are subject to less
volatile shocks, generate higher interconnectedness. Here, it is the homogeneity of the thresholds, or otherwise
said their lesser variance, that generates more connectivity.
Our paper is complementary to the line of research on the control of contagion, e.g., [3, 14, 15]. In these
works, a central party, for example a regulator or government, seeks to minimize contagion. In [7] the author
explores the effect of moral hazard on network topology, as the network is formed with the anticipation of
government bailouts in case of distress. Parallel to the development of network models for systemic risk, a
recent series of works [6, 9–11, 11] introduced a reduced form approach to systemic risk analysis, based on mean
field interaction models. In these works, the trajectories of the banks are modeled as a set of coupled diffusions,
which may be controlled by a central party that specifies the parameters of the interaction. Here in contrast,
the financial institutions themselves are the decision makers, and their decision is made before the shock, with
a rational expectation on the way the cascade will evolve following the shock.
While most of the work on contagion in financial networks refers to banking networks, a recent literature [4, 13]
considers insurance-reinsurance networks. Contagion proceeds similarly in such networks, as failed reinsurers
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cannot honor contracts to other institutions, and such failures can propagate via chains of reinsurance contracts.
Our work offers thus guidance on the formation of such networks and their inherent risk.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we present the model of contagion and the nodes’ optimiza-
tion criteria. In section 2 we investigate the existence and uniqueness of the optimal connectivity, under an
anticipated link failure probability. In Section 3 we analyze the equilibrium connectivity. Finally, in Section 4
we study numerically the equilibrium choice as a function of fundamentals.
1. Node performance under linkage benefits and contagion risk
We represent a financial system by n institutions (nodes), endowed with a sequence of thresholds (θ(i))i∈[n].
We can interpret the nodes as banks, in which case the thresholds represent the funding that these banks can
raise from external lenders. Banks loan to other banks, and thus choose their connectivity and form funding
linkages. Alternatively, we can interpret the nodes as insurance companies. Their threshold represents their
capital. They can reinsure other insurance companies, and to do so they choose their connectivity and form
reinsurance linkages.
Given a connectivity λ(i), i ∈ [n] , nodes form links according to the random matching from the configuration
model. In the configuration model with given degree sequence λ(i), i ∈ [n], each node i is assigned λ(i) incoming
half edges and λ(i) outgoing half edges. The (multi)graph results from uniform matching of the in-coming half
edges and the outgoing half edges. As n → ∞, self loops and parallel edges become rare, and the graph is
simple with positive probability [12]. This means that any property that holds with high probability on the
configuration model, also holds with high probability conditional on this random graph being simple. This
graph is denoted by G and we write (i, j) ∈ G for the event that there’s a link between i and j. We let µn(λ, θ)
be the fraction of nodes with degree λ and threshold θ,
µn(λ, θ) :=
{i ∈ [n] | θ(i) = θ, λ(i) = λ}
n
.
We assume the following regularity conditions µn(λ, θ)→ µ(λ, θ), as n tends to∞. We let the fraction of nodes
with threshold θ, be defined as
µ(θ) :=
∑
λ
µ(λ, θ).
This network is subject to contagion risk. After the network is formed, a shock occurs and a set D0, representing
a fraction ε of the entire system, switches its threshold to zero. If the financial network represents a network of
funding relations among banks, the initial shock has the meaning that the debt capacity of certain banks becomes
zero, i.e., no party lends to them, so they exogenously become illiquid. If the financial network represents a
network of reinsurance contracts among insurance companies, then the initial shock is to be interpreted that
the capital of certain insurers becomes zero following an extreme event. Under both of these representations,
the thresholds becoming zero is equivalent to the failure of the node.
This initial set of failures triggers a cascade of failures, as we assume that failed nodes cut linkages from the
nodes connected to them. Banks that fail after becoming illiquid cut loans from other banks in the system.
These banks in turn also fail if their debt capacity is smaller than the amount of funding that was cut by failed
banks. Insurers that fail after their capital becomes zero cut the reinsurance of other insurers. These other
insurers in turn also fail if their capital is smaller than the amount of reinsurance that was cut by failed insurers.
In sum, whenever a the node’s threshold is smaller than the number of linkages that are cut from it, then it
fails due to contagion.
We have D1 := {j ∈ Dc0 | θ(j) <
∑
i∈D0 1 (i,j)∈G}, with
c denoting set complement. The cascade progresses
according to Dn := {j ∈ Dcn−1 | θ(j) <
∑
i∈Dn−1 1 (i,j)∈G}, and it stops after at most n steps. We let Df be the
set of failures at the end of contagion process. We have the following theorem, which characterizes the set of
failures.
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Theorem 1 ([1]). Let p∗ be the smallest fixed point of the map J in [0, 1], where
J(p) :=
∑
θ,λ
λµ(θ, λ)∑
θ,λ λµ(θ, λ)
·B(θ, λ, p),
with
B(θ, λ, p) := P(Bin(λ, p) ≥ θ) =
λ∑
l≥θ
(
λ
l
)
pl(1− p)λ−l.
Here Bin denotes a random variable with binomial distribution with parameters λ and p.
(i) If p∗ = 1, i.e., if J(p) > p for all p ∈ [0, 1), then asymptotically (when n → ∞) almost all nodes fail
during the cascade.
(ii) If p∗ < 1 and p∗ is a stable fixed point of J , i.e., J ′(p∗) < 1, then the final fraction of failures
|Df |
n
converges in probability to
∑
λ,θ µ(λ, θ)
∑j
θ=0B(θ, λ, p
∗).
The asymptotic fraction of surviving nodes with degree λ and threshold θ at the end of the contagion is given
(in the limit) by
sθ,λ = µ(θ, λ)(1−B(θ, λ, p∗)).
Remark 2. Consider the fixed point equation p∗ = J(p∗) and multiply both sides with n
∑
θ,λ λµ(θ, λ), which
represents the total number of links in the network. Then p∗n
∑
θ,λ λµ(θ, λ) represents the number of failed links
(links from failed nodes) present in the system. This must be equal at the end of the cascade to
∑
θ,λ λnµ(θ, λ)B(θ, λ, p
∗),
which gives the sum across nodes with different θ of their failed links. In other words, all failed links have been
“accounted for” in terms of the nodes which are the counterparties.
This result is established by describing the contagion process using a Markov chain of lower dimension than
the initial system, in which we aggregate nodes according to their connectivity, threshold, and number of
failed counterparties. From the point of view of the evolution of the cascade, the nodes in the same class are
indistinguishable. We then show that, as the network size increases, the Markov chain rescaled by network size
converges in probability to a limit described by a system of ordinary differential equations, which can be solved
in closed form. This readily gives us the asymptotic fraction of surviving nodes (in each class of connectivity
and threshold) at the end of the cascade, namely sθ,j .
It is clear that any node in the network is exposed to global failure risk captured by p∗. We refer to p∗ as the
global failure probability of a link. The failure probability of a node with degree λ and threshold θ is B(θ, λ, p∗).
As nodes add more connectivity, they increase the risk of contagion. Of course, nodes add connectivity because
they derive benefits from their linkages. We capture these benefits in a simple way, by assuming that there
exists a numéraire and that surviving nodes with connectivity λ receive λ (units of the numéraire) at the end
of the cascade. They receive no benefit from their linkages if they fail.
Remark 3. Note that the ability to define a global failure probability depends on our choice of the configuration
model as an underlying network. The configuration model is a flexible setting as it gives the possibility to use
any degree distribution, but it carries the implicit assumption that a linkage default probability is independent
of the end node in equilibrium. It remains an open problem to extend the equilibrium analysis below to other
types of random graphs, e.g. inhomogeneous random graphs, and for case when the global failure probability is
replaced by a failure probability matrix (with the default probability of a link depending on the types of its end
nodes).
We are now ready to define the nodes’ performance measure.
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Definition 4 (Nodes’ performance). We define the performance criterion for a node with degree j and threshold
θ as the expected benefit of linkages, and it is given in the asymptotic limit by
λ
(
1−B(θ, λ, p∗)
)
,
with p∗ given in Theorem 1.
Note that the global failure probability of a link p∗ depends on the connectivity choice of all nodes. Therefore,
the optimal connectivity is an outcome of an equilibrium. We proceed in two steps to determine this equilibrium.
In the first step, we let the nodes choose their connectivity according to an expected failure probability p of a
link, i.e., a node with threshold θ chooses a connectivity
λ∗(θ, p) ∈ arg max
λ
λ
(
1−B(θ, λ, p)
)
. (1)
In the second step, detailed in Section 3, we will impose an equilibrium condition that the expected failure
probability of a link coincides with the actual failure probability of a link, under the optimal connectivity.
Before we proceed, we note that the banks maximize an expected payoff which is equal to the connectivity if
the bank doesn’t fail and 0 if it does. One could argue that in the performance criterion banks should only count
the profit from the surviving linkages. In fact, whether we should use the expected benefit from all linkages or
the expected benefit from the surviving links depends on the model interpretation. It can be of interest to use
the expected benefit and not the expected benefit from the surviving links when surviving banks replace the
defaulted links with new funding from outside creditors to maintain their business. In such case the replaced
linkages have the same function as the original ones.
One could also assume that failed links do not provide any benefit and maximize the product of the probability
of survival 1−B(θ, λ, p) and the expectation of non-failed links λ(1− p). The next remark shows that for fixed
failure probability p of a link, the banks’ choice remains the same. This in turn implies the equilibrium and its
stability properties remain the same.
Remark 5 (Robustness to the performance criterion). We can also define our performance criterion as the
expected benefit from the survived links. There are two possible criteria. For fixed θ and p,
• V1(λ) := (1− p)λ
(
1−B(θ, λ, p)
)
. In this case the optimizer remains the same as above since
max
λ
V1(λ) = (1− p) max
λ
λ
(
1−B(θ, λ, p)
)
.
Thus
arg max
λ
V1(λ) = arg max
λ
λ
(
1−B(θ, λ, p)
)
.
• V2(λ) :=
∑
l<θ(λ− l)
(
λ
l
)
pl(1− p)λ−l. Straightforward computation shows that
V2(λ) =
∑
l<θ
λ
(
λ− 1
l
)
pl(1− p)λ−l = (1− p)λ
(
1−B(θ, λ− 1, p)
)
.
Thus
arg max
λ
V2(λ) = arg max
λ
λ
(
1−B(θ, λ− 1, p)
)
,
which shares the same structure as the original criterion and will lead to similar results.
Which criterion is more suitable depends on the contagion model. When the direction of link is the same
as the direction of contagion (i.e. i loans to j and there is contagion from i to j and the link (i, j) fails when
i withdraws funding from j) then V1 represents the expected benefit of the non-failed links of the surviving
banks.
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When the direction of the link is inverse to the direction of contagion (i.e. i loans to j and there is contagion
from j to i and the link (i, j) fails because j is insolvent or cannot pay the loan) then V2 represents the expected
benefit of the non-failed links of the surviving banks.
2. Nodes’ optimal connectivity choice
In this section we investigate existence and uniqueness of the node’s optimal connectivity. We begin by
noting that the node’s optimization problem carries a tradeoff. We recognize here that 1 − B(θ, λ, p) is equal
to the Incomplete beta function I1−p(λ − θ + 1, θ). We recall that Ix(a + 1, b) = Ix(a, b) − x
a(1−x)b
aB(a,b) , where
B(a, b) =
∫ 1
0
xa−1(1 − x)b−1dx. We have I1−p(λ − θ + 2, θ) = I1−p(λ − θ + 1, θ) − (1−p)
λ−θ+1pθ
(λ−θ)B(λ−θ+1,θ) and thus
1−B(θ, λ+ 1, p) < 1−B(θ, λ, p), which means that the survival probability decreases in λ.
The node’s performance as a function of connectivity can now be written as
V (λ) := λ · I1−p(λ− θ + 1, θ).
It is easy to see that this performance balances more benefits from connectivity (via the factor λ) against more
risk, via the decreasing surviving probability I1−p(λ− θ + 1, θ).
Proposition 6 (Existence). The optimization problem admits a finite optimizer λ∗(θ, p) which lies in the
interval
[
1−p
p ∨ θ,
θ−2p+
√
(θ−2p)2+4(1−p)p
2p
]
.
Proof. We will show that the node’s performance V (λ) is decreasing in λ for λ >
θ−2p+
√
(θ−2p)2+4(1−p)p
2p and is
increasing for λ < 1−pp ∨ θ. Recall that
(
λ+1
l
)
= λ+1λ+1−l
(
λ
l
)
= 11−l/(λ+1)
(
λ
l
)
. We have
V (λ+ 1)− V (λ) =
∑
l≤θ−1
[(λ+ 1)
1− p
1− l/(λ+ 1)
− λ]
(
λ
l
)
(1− p)λ−lpl.
Now if λ >
−(2−θ)+2(1−p)+
√
(2−θ−2+2p)2+4(1−p)p
2p =
θ−2p+
√
(θ−2p)2+4(1−p)p
2p , then we have (λ+ 1)
1−p
1−(θ−1)/(λ+1) −
λ < 0. This gives (λ+ 1) 1−p1−l/(λ+1) − λ < 0, for all l ≤ θ − 1 since (λ+ 1)
1−p
1−l/(λ+1) − λ is increasing in l. This
leads to (λ+1)2(1−p) < λ(λ+2−θ). Thus λ > −(2−θ)+2(1−p)+
√
(2−θ−2+2p)2+4(1−p)p
2p =
θ−2p+
√
(θ−2p)2+4(1−p)p
2p .
Therefore if λ >
θ−2p+
√
(θ−2p)2+4(1−p)p
2p , then V (λ + 1) − V (λ) < 0. Thus the optimal λ
∗ should lie in the
interval [0,
θ−2p+
√
(θ−2p)2+4(1−p)p
2p ].
Similarly if λ < 1−pp , then (λ+ 1)(1− p)− λ > 0 and thus we have (λ+ 1)
1−p
1−l/(λ+1) − λ > 0 for all l ≤ θ− 1,
again by the monotonicity in l. This gives that V (λ + 1) − V (λ) > 0 which means the optimal λ∗ should be
greater than 1−pp . Also it is obvious to choose λ
∗ ≥ θ for players with threshold θ. We conclude that the optimal
λ∗ should lie in the interval
[
1−p
p ∨ θ,
θ−2p+
√
(θ−2p)2+4(1−p)p
2p
]
.

Corollary 7. The optimal connectivity lies in [ 1−pp ∨ θ,
θ
p − 1].
Proof. This follows from Proposition 6 and the fact that
θ−2p+
√
(θ−2p)2+4(1−p)p
2p <
θ
p − 1. 
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Remark 8. The same results hold for the performance criterion V2. We mirror the proof of the existence result,
Proposition 6. We have
V2(λ+ 1)− V2(λ) =
∑
l≤θ−1
[(λ+ 1)
1− p
1− l/λ
− λ]
(
λ− 1
l
)
(1− p)λ−1−lpl.
If λ > θ−pp , then we have (λ + 1)
1−p
1−(θ−1)/λ − λ < 0. This gives (λ + 1)
1−p
1−l/λ − λ < 0, for all l ≤ θ − 1 since
(λ + 1) 1−p1−l/λ − λ is increasing in l. This leads to (λ + 1)(1 − p) < λ + 1 − θ. Thus λ >
θ−p
p . Therefore if
λ > θ−pp , then V2(λ+ 1)− V2(λ) < 0. Thus the optimal λ
∗ should lie in the interval [0, θp − 1].
Similarly if λ < 1−pp , then (λ + 1)(1 − p) − λ > 0 and thus we have (λ + 1)
1−p
1−l/λ − λ > 0 for all l ≤ θ − 1,
again by the monotonicity in l. This gives that V2(λ + 1) − V2(λ) > 0 which means the optimal λ∗ should be
greater than 1−pp . Also it is obvious to choose λ
∗ ≥ θ for players with threshold θ. We conclude that the optimal
λ∗ lies in the interval
[
1−p
p ∨ θ,
θ
p − 1
]
.
3. Equilibrium
We now impose the equilibrium condition, that the failure probability given by Theorem 1 with nodes at
their optimal connectivity coincides with the anticipated failure probability.
Definition 9. We call (p∗, (λ∗(θ), θ ≥ 0)) an standard equilibrium if
• Given p∗,
λ∗(θ) ∈ arg max
λ
λ
(
1−B(θ, λ, p∗)
)
, for each θ; (2)
• p∗ is the smallest solution of the fixed point equation :
p∗ =
∑
θ
λ∗(θ)µ(θ)∑
θ λ
∗(θ)µ(θ)
·B(θ, λ∗(θ), p∗). (3)
The fixed point equation in the equilibrium definition is derived from the fixed point equation in Theorem
1, where the connectivity is set to λ∗(θ) and we note that µ(θ) = µ(θ, λ∗(θ)).
Combining the two conditions above, we see that in equilibrium the failure probability of a link p∗ is the
smallest fixed point of the map
φ(p) :=
∑
θ
λ∗(θ, p)µ(θ)∑
θ λ
∗(θ, p)µ(θ)
·B(θ, λ∗(θ, p), p). (4)
Now we study the existence of the equilibrium.
Proposition 10 (Existence of equilibrium). When λ∗(θ, p) is continuous in p ∈ [0, 1), the function φ admits
at least one fixed point p∗. When λ∗(θ, p) is not continuous in p, the map φ admits a “relaxed” fixed point p̂
defined as p̂ := min{p, φ(p) ≤ p, p ∈ [0, 1)}. For both cases, we let λ∗(θ) = λ∗(θ, p∗).
Proof. The proof is immediate: when λ∗(θ, p) is continuous in p ∈ [0, 1) then the function φ is continuous in
[0, 1). It thus admits at least one fixed point since limp→1 φ(p) ≤
∑
θ
µ(θ) λ
∗(θ,p)∑
θ λ
∗(θ,p)µ(θ) = 1 and limp→0 φ(0) ≥ 0.
When λ∗(θ, p) is not continuous, the relaxed fixed point always exists since φ(0) ≥ 0 and φ(1) ≤ 1. 
Remark 11. The continuity of λ∗(θ, p) in p is guaranteed by the uniqueness of the optimal connectivity λ∗(θ, p).
However, this uniqueness is difficult to show for problem (1). We provide below a uniqueness result for an
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approximated problem obtained by approximating the binomial distribution in (1) by the Poisson distribution
Pois(λp) when λ is large enough and p is small :
λ∗(θ, p) ∈ arg max
λ
λ
(
1− Pois(θ, λ, p)
)
, (5)
where 1− Pois(θ, λ, p) =
∑θ−1
k=0
(λp)ke−λp
k! .
Proposition 12 (Uniqueness). The approximated optimization problem (5) admits an unique solution λ∗.
Proof. Recall that ( (λp)
ke−λp
k! )
′
= p( (λp)
k−1e−λp
(k−1)! −
(λp)ke−λp
k! ). Thus
d[λ(1− Pois(θ, λ, p))]
dλ
=
θ−1∑
k=0
(λp)ke−λp
k!
− λpe−λp + λ
θ−1∑
k=1
p(
(λp)k−1e−λp
(k − 1)!
− (λp)
ke−λp
k!
)
=
θ−1∑
k=0
(λp)ke−λp
k!
− λp · (λp)
θ−1e−λp
(θ − 1)!
.
The optimal λ∗ should satisfy
θ−1∑
k=0
(λp)k
k!
=
(λp)θ
(θ − 1)!
.
We note that if λ ≥ θ+1p , then
(λp)k+1
(k+1)! >
(λp)k
k! , for k = 0, 1, . . . θ − 1. Thus,
θ−1∑
k=0
(λp)k
k!
< θ
(λp)θ
θ!
=
(λp)θ
(θ − 1)!
.
So we must have λ∗ < θ+1p . It follows that
d2[λ(1− Pois(θ, λ, p))]
dλ2
= −p · (λp)
θ−1e−λp
(θ − 1)!
− p(θ) (λp)
θ−1e−λp
(θ − 1)!
+ p
(λp)θe−λp
(θ − 1)!
< 0.
Thus λ(1− Pois(θ, λ, p)) is concave in λ and uniqueness of the optimizer follows. 
Remark 13. Relation to the Nash equilibrium
We can relate the equilibrium of Definition 9 to a Nash equilibrium of the following game. Any player with
threshold θ0, given the connectivity {λ(θ)}θ 6=θ0 of the other players, computes its optimal connectivity
λ∗(θ0, p) ∈ arg max
λ
λ
(
1−B(θ0, λ, p)
)
,
under the constraint that∑
θ 6=θ0
µ(θ)
λ(θ)∑
θ 6=θ0
µ(θ)λ(θ) + µ(θ0)λ∗(θ0)
B(θ, λ(θ), p) + µ(θ0)
λ∗(θ0)∑
θ 6=θ0
µ(θ)λ(θ) + µ(θ0)λ∗(θ0)
B(θ0, j, p) = p.
We can rewrite the above constraint p = G(λ∗(θ)θ 6=θ0 , λ) for some function G. Thus, the optimization
criterion can be rewritten as :
λ∗(θ) ∈ arg max
λ
λ[1−B(λ, θ0, G(λ∗(θ)θ 6=θ0 , λ))].
In this sense, (λ∗(θ), θ ≥ 0) is a Nash equilibrium.
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3.1. Analysis of the equilibrium
Case 1: The system is perfectly observable to all the nodes, i.e. all the θ and their distribution µ(θ) are
common knowledge. Then all the nodes will simultaneously choose their connectivity in the equilibrium state
by rational expectations and the system simultaneously reaches the equilibrium (λ∗(θ), θ ≥ 0), by virtue of
Proposition 10.
Case 2: The system is only partially observed by the players, for example each player only knows his own
threshold θ. All the players optimally choose their linkage λ∗(θ, p0) according to some anticipated link failure
probability p0 (this could be the failure probability estimated from the current environment). Then the link
failure probability p1 in the next stage is determined by the fixed point of the map p→ F (p0, p), where
F (p0, p) :=
∑
θ
µ(θ)
λ∗(θ, p0)∑
θ µ(θ)λ
∗(θ, p0)
[1−B(θ, λ∗(θ, p0), p)]. (6)
Then all nodes adjust their expectation of link failure probability from p0 to p1 and choose connectivity λ∗(θ, p1)
corresponding to p1. This will be further updated to a series of link failure probabilities {p0, p1...pn}.
We conjecture that the sequence {p0, p1...pn} will not convergence to the equilibrium states p∗, since the following
map H is divergent near the equilibrium state
H : p0 → p1 = min{p|
∑
θ
µ(θ)
λ∗(θ, p0)∑
θ µ(θ)λ
∗(θ, p0)
[1−B(θ, λ∗(θ, p0), p)] = p}. (7)
This means that the equilibrium is not stable in the sense that starting from the neighborhood of the equilib-
rium state, the above update of the rational expectations on the failure probability will not converge to the
equilibrium.
Our numerical results give the examples of this instability phenomenon for different initial distributions:
(i) Uniform initial distribution of θ on the interval [0, 30] (Figure 1);
(ii) Gaussian initial distribution of θ on the interval [0, 30] with mean 15 and standard deviation 1.8 (Figure
2);
(iii) Two-sided distribution with µ(0) = 0.3, µ(30) = 0.7 and µ(θ) = 0 for θ /∈ {0, 30} (Figure 3);
(iv) Gaussian initial distribution of θ on the interval [0, 200] with mean 100 and standard deviation 40.6
(Figure 4);
4. Numerical results
In this section we discuss how the link failure probability in equilibrium changes with respect to the initial
distribution. More precisely, we consider different initial distributions on some range of the capacity θ. All
distributions have the same mean but different variances. We choose θ in the interval [0, 30] and we consider a
Gaussian distribution on this range with mean 15 and standard deviation γ. We vary γ from 1 to 6, and we find
that the link failure probability in equilibrium drops from 0.14072 to 0.13748. This shows that relatively less
concentration in the initial distribution leads to less failure probability in equilibrium, see Figure 5. Moreover,
the increase of the standard deviation in the initial distribution of θ leads to larger average connectivities in
equilibrium. This is consistent with the results in [1] that the average connectivity is a too simple statistics of
network topology, see Figure 6.
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Figure 1. Divergence near the equilibrium state for uniform initial distribution of θ on [0, 30].
The map H has slope > 1 near the equilibrium state.
Figure 2. Divergence near the equilibrium state for Gaussian initial distribution of θ on [0, 30]
(with standard deviation 2). The map H has a slope > 1 near the equilibrium state.
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Figure 3. Divergence near the equilibrium state for two-sided distribution with µ(0) = 0.3,
µ(30) = 0.7 ). The map H has a slope > 1 near the equilibrium state.
Figure 4. Divergence near the equilibrium state for Gaussian initial distribution of θ on [0, 200]
(with standard deviation 30). The map H has a slope > 1 near the equilibrium state.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we considered the optimal choice of connectivities by nodes in a large network. The nodes
balance the benefits of connectivity with the risk of the contagion, which is endogenous and depends on the
strategies of all nodes. We have studied the existence of an equilibrium in the system and the stability prop-
erties. Under full information, the equilibrium is reached simultaneously by all nodes, whereas under partial
information, we show numerically that the equilibrium is unstable in the sense that a sequence of anticipated
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1-6.png
Figure 5. Failure probability in equilibrium with different initial distribution of θ on [0, 30]. As
the standard deviation parameter γ increases from 1 to 6, the failure probability in equilibrium
drops from 0.14072 to 0.13748.
1-6.png
Figure 6. The average connectivities of the system in the equilibrium with different initial
distribution of θ on [0,30]. As the standard deviation parameter γ increases from 1 to 6, the
average connectivity firstly increases from 79.295 to 81.029 then drops to 80.989 .
link failure probabilities does not converge. Our numerical results demonstrate that more concentrated distri-
butions of threshold lead to equilibria with smaller average connectivity but higher failure probability. This
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suggests new directions of research on the relation between failure and connectivity in endogenous networks
especially with dynamic feature.
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